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Abstract: Drug trafficking has become the new threat to the economic and political stability of the West Africa 
sub-region; by virtue of its new toga as the new transit hub for drug trafficking. 80% and 13% of seizures in 
cocaine transhipment annually of 60 – 250 tons to Europe and globally respectively, passes the West African 
maritime borderlands/coast. The informal economy based on drugs has replaces over $400 million contribution to 
the region’s GDP from fishing. The impacts of drug trafficking had had a long negative toll on the institutions of 
the states and state-building infrastructure in the region. Besides, intra-states conflicts, drug money and activities 
had exacerbated state failure in the region; notably in Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Guinea, etc. The West African Coast 
Initiative is making crawling impacts. Although, still in its pilot phase, it had enhanced coordination of intelligence 
in the region on drug trafficking and organized crime. However, it is still short of fundamentally addressing 
obvious policy gap, due to its lack of clear focus; plus, being only operational in just five West African states. This 
paper identified absence of comprehensive maritime coordination policy against drug trafficking in West Africa as 
the bane of the surge. Therefore, a tripartite approach, based on state, regional and global levels policy 
restructuring in the region is required.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the beginning of the century, drug trafficking had assumed a terrifying 
dimension in the West Africa (WA) sub-region, leading to its emergence as the new transit 
hub for drugs trafficking, especially cocaine from South America (production origin) to 
Europe and other parts (consumers). Drug trafficking has emerged the 21st century dilemma 
to political and economic stability of the region, who hitherto is struggling with fragility. With 
a decline in demand in the United States, a better controlled Caribbean route, a rising market 
in Europe, ungoverned waterways in Gulf of Guinea, South American drug traffickers took 
advantage of the loose West African region as transit zone (UNODC, 20013). Available data 
shows over 50% of the non-United States bound drugs transit through the West Africa and 
making 13% of the global drug trafficking index. The enormity of maritime border in the 
region cannot be overemphasized; about 80% of the 60 – 250 tons of drugs valued at 
between $3 and $14 billion into the West Africa sub-region comes through the maritime 
borders (Van Riper; Stephen 2014). The formal economy based in fishing contributing 
positively to the huge youth unemployment crisis and over $400 million to the region‟s GDP 
is being gradually eroded in place of the informal economy based on drugs trafficking; hence 
transforming the region „From a Gold Coast to Coke Coast‟. 
The maritime waters of Cape Verde, Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Canary Islands, and 
other countries along the Gulf of Guinea have contributed to the growth in cocaine 
shipments via West Africa in the last couple of years. The gravity of the challenge may have 
been more, weak law enforcement compounded by lack of capacity (human/material 
resources) and other important factors including weak regional coordination have had 
significant impact. Available data represents only the seizures, which means, it may not have 
fully captured the actual trafficking flows via the region. United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC)‟s database reflects this alarming dimension under discuss; the total number 
of seizures in Europe which came through the Africa region in 2007 was 22%, from 5% and 
1% in 2004 and 2000 respectively. An estimated “35% of the cocaine produced and shipped 
from the coasts of Colombia, Venezuela, the Guyanas, and Brazil is trafficked via the 
European/African corridor” (Country Report – Colombia 2007, 77-79). The main new trend 
around various countries on the Gulf of Guinea has been the phenomenal increase in cocaine 
shipments via West Africa maritime borderlands. 
Globally, the issue of drug trafficking, especially cocaine trafficking, the vast bulk of the 
flow proceeds from the Andean region (Colombia produces half of global flow in 2008 (450 
tons), followed by Peru (302 tons) and Bolivia (113 tons) to North America (often via Central 
America) and Europe (often via West Africa) (TOCTA 2010, 81). The global value is estimated 
at $88 billion annually; 43% in North America and 39% in Europe. Incidentally, since the 
1980s, the consumption in the United States (the largest global consumer of 10.5 million in 
1982) has been on a growing downward trend and further plunged dramatically since 2006. 
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This has been attributed to various factors, ranging from: effective enforcement efforts 
in the US and counter-trafficking measures in Latin America, disruption in trafficking routes, 
etc. Similarly, International attention and intervention, as well as political changes, appear to 
have substantially reduced trafficking through West Africa after 2007 (UNODC 2010). Europe 
occupies the world‟s second largest cocaine market besides North America; that is, the 27 
countries of the European Union (EU) and the four countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). By 2007/2008, the United Kingdom (UK) stars as the single largest cocaine 
market in Europe, followed by Spain, Italy, Germany and France. The number of users in the 
Europe has doubled over the years; from 2 million in 1998 to 4.1 million in 2007/08. This 
increase means more pressure to create additional route for the expanded demand, 
according to TOCTA report (2010). Most of the drug trafficking to Europe is done through 
the maritime waters/sea (as depicted in figure 1.), usually by container shipments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Drug Seizures via Maritime Transshipment in West Africa Coast (Source: UNODC 2013). 
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However, other means, such as deliveries by small aircrafts/air and cross-border 
movement or postal services are equally rampant. According to the World Customs 
Organization (WCO), 69% of the total volume of cocaine seized en route to Western Europe 
was detected on board boats or vessels, concealed in freight or in the vessels‟ structure.  
The data reveal that, while a large number of smaller shipments are detected at 
airports and by post, the bulk of drug shipments to Europe are mainly by sea (UNODC 2009). 
This is where West Africa becomes pivotal to the drug transit to Europe. 
The rising demands in Europe and containment/decline usage in North America has 
shifted the paradigm and necessitated alternative routes to Europe in recent years. Also, the 
increasing difficulties for direct transshipment from Andean region to Europe, due to high 
investments in maritime patrol and technology by the European Union (EU); opens the idea 
for available vulnerable alternative routes, hence, West Africa. Secondly, the absence of 
unsupervised expanse of maritime waters between the Andean coasts and the West African 
coast is a dimension susceptible to easy drug trafficking or illicit commodity movements, en-
route other destinations. Since the 2000s, two main drugs trans-shipment hubs have 
emerged in West Africa: one around Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, and the other along the 
borderlands stretching between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, etc. corridors. More often than not, 
the drugs shipments by to the West African coast don‟t get to mainland before offloaded 
from mother ships into smaller vessels; which proceeds to Europe through Spain and 
Portugal, and sometimes by land and air, not just to Europe but Asia and North America. 
(SOCA 2009) For example, West Africa traffickers have gained prominence in France since 
2004, because, Nigerians became top amongst the nationalities of foreign cocaine traffickers; 
they consist of a third of all arrests among foreign traffickers in 2006 (TOCTA 2010). 
The West Africa sub-region is in constant battle with several problems, ranging from 
poverty, diseases, unemployment, piracy, desertification, etc. Also, among the Transnational 
Organized Crime (TOC) are: natural resources (including crude oil theft, illegal mining), 
cigarettes, fake/counterfeit medication, human trafficking (women and children), small arms, 
toxic waste, and migrant workers. While each of the TOCs affects each country differently, 
and are serious, but they do not concentrate quick money or financial capital (as cocaine) 
into hands of a few local lords thereby posing a real challenge to the state. Recent time has 
seen drug trafficking and illegal dealings in natural/mineral resources dominated West Africa 
instability discuss (TOCTA 2010). Therefore, the focus of this paper is drug trafficking, more 
especially, the flow through the maritime borderlands; because of its financial involvement 
and how it has affected this poor region negatively. 
Drug trafficking through the region was earlier detected in large-scale quantity in 
2004, signaling a shift in the centre of gravity of the global market from the USA to Europe. 
However, from 2008, there was declining situation due primarily to international awareness 
and an increase global focus on the region in order to stem the tide. One of such results led 
the discovery of states-drug lord‟s collaborations e.g. the former president of Guinean-
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Bissau‟s sons and senior military chiefs are involved in drug trade, according to West Africa 
Commission on Drugs (WACD). Drug money had been assumed to be used to prosecute 
elections in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and other countries within the region. 
Since the focus of this paper is the examination of policy failure, especially in 
addressing drug trafficking through the maritime coast of the region, where over 69% of 
drugs (according to WCO seizures) into Europe passes through; greater emphasis will 
therefore be directed at identifying the real policy problem and raising strategic policy 
options to tackle them. Fundamental to the problem identified is the absence or lack of clear-
cut maritime policy that focuses on drug trafficking in the region. However, in the course the 
research, a few militating factors was contributing to this problem; they include: rampant 
intra-state conflict and poverty in the region leading to weak/underdeveloped maritime 
security capacity; the problem of piracy; and non-availability of policy direction on maritime 
security against drug traffic. In view of these, the paper developed a three-prong policy 
options focusing on state-level capacity improvement/support; regional-level policy reviews 
to accommodate maritime aspect; and global-level of leadership. Therefore, the 
recommendations border on how these three approaches are combined into structural 
frameworks that can address the policy problem. 
 
IMPACTS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING ON THE WEST AFRICAN STATE-BUILDING 
 
The threat of destruction in local states structure by drug trafficking is enormous and 
cannot be easily quantify or measured. The deadliest so far witnessed in the region is the 
destruction or compromising of already weakened institutions and symbols that protect 
statehood. Drug traffickers are able to penetrate the highest levels of military commands and 
also install favorite politicians into office through financing of elections. Law enforcement 
personnel are offered more than they could earn in a lifetime, to just looking away. These 
control guarantees drug trafficking operations with very little resistance from the state actors. 
According to the UNODC 2011 Research Paper, the multiplier effect of drug trafficking in the 
region had frustrated states-building efforts and further complicated the political process 
(UNODC 2011). Guinea-Bissau provides the first example. A country with GDP of $532 million 
(2010) (UN Data: Guinea Bissau.), and one of the worst in the region most affected by the 
drug trade economically and politically. There is no secret that the hierarchy of her military 
and the political elites are enmeshed in the trade. The country‟s Chief of the Army (Tagme na 
Wai) had once accused President João Vieira of involvement in drug trafficking prior to the 
2008 elections. Due to rivalry and trade control among the classes, led to the death in 2009 
of Tagme na Wai; a reprisal which also claimed the life of the president. This further plunged 
the already unstable country into much deeper crisis. 
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Similarly, in Guinea (2009), following the ouster of the long-time country‟s former 
dictator through a military coup d’état, several senior public officials and the president‟s sons 
were discovered to be involved in rings of drug trafficking using diplomatic pouches and 
passports to move drugs. In 2010, the president of the Gambia busted a ring of drug 
traffickers comprising high-level public officials and consequently ordered their arrests and 
prosecution. They include: the National Police Chief and his deputy, Minister of Fisheries, 
deputy chief of the army, chief of the navy, and chief of the National Drug Enforcement 
Agency, his deputy and his head of operations. In Sierra Leone, the Minister of 
Transportation resigned after his brother was implicated in the country‟s largest cocaine 
seizure. Since state‟s actor‟s involvement in drug trafficking is predominant in West Africa, 
violence report or occurrences have been very minimal. Scanty evidence exists on dealings of 
insurgent‟s groups in drugs. However, the lack of reports could also be associated with 
absence of empirical or reliable data on homicide in West Africa. Emerging concerns have 
therefore been the risk of access by some of the dormant militant groups in West Africa; as 
this will somehow be a game changer. While there has not been a verifiable proof of 
insurgent groups‟ involvement, the 2012 political conflict in Mali had linked drug finance to 
the Tuareg and the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) back Islamist groups. 
 
The Absence of Clear Regional Maritime Coordination Policy against Drug Trafficking 
 
The absence of clear and coherent maritime coordination policy against drug 
trafficking in the region is foundational to the current maritime drug crisis. Despite maritime 
coast contributing to the majority (according to WCU (69%) and Riper 2014 (80%)) of means 
used to transport drugs from Latin America into the West Africa region en-route Europe, a 
conclusion supported by the UNODC data/map shown above; there has not been a visibly 
clear-cut maritime policy direction against drug trafficking either by individual states or at the 
regional level. This is worrisome and ironical in view of other several policy initiatives targeted 
at drug trafficking via the air and land. There seems a misplacement of priorities and/or 
deliberate attempt to shy away from confronting the real issue. Better still; the maritime 
policies are not synchronized to work together at addressing many challenges from one 
front. Of course, this is not to say; there are no enough handicaps, some of which are 
attributed to three main factors: 
 
Weak Maritime Security Capacity due to Inland Political Conflict and Finance 
 
Firstly, undeveloped maritime security capacity due to perverse inland political conflict 
and poverty; leaving the ungoverned waters at the mercy of drug lords. Virtually all West 
African states are either in active conflict or recovering/in a post-conflict state-building phase. 
Greater portion of the state‟s resources (human and material) are deplored towards inland 
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armed conflicts management, thereby relegating the maritime security and waterways to the 
background. Similarly, the Guinea Bissau coup d‟état of April 2012 accentuated the notion or 
thinking of the criminal networks; that, in order to firmly control the drug trafficking access, 
controlling the state institutions is pivotal (Shaw 2012). In many ways, the TOC networks 
frustrate state institutions and instigate their underdevelopment in order to provide little or 
no resistance to their operations. West Africa is famous for being one of the poorest and 
politically unstable regions in the world. Out of the 16 countries in this region, only three are 
not on the list of the United Nations least developed countries; meanwhile five of the 
countries are at the lowest bottom of United Nations Human Development Index. More than 
half the countries are currently experiencing some forms of instability (LDC Report 2014). It 
possesses one of the world‟s current deadliest insurgent group known as Boko Haram (in 
Nigeria); killing over 13,000 persons since 2009: according to Amnesty International. Perennial 
insurgent groups exist in Côte d‟Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, Niger, etc. The region is still recovering 
from the memories of brutal civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Since independence, West 
Africa has experienced at least 58 coups and countercoups; some as recent as March 2012 in 
Mali. Nine countries in West Africa sub-region featured, according to a recent rating of the 
25 countries with the highest risks of instability globally: Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d‟Ivoire and Benin (Hewitt et al. 2010). 
These weights portend a real burden on the ability of the West African states to 
adequately stand a better chance or develop naval capacity at responding to drug trafficking, 
especially on the maritime front. Since several of efforts are land-related; only the Army in 
most West Africa countries is fairly developed. Others don‟t have the navy personnel or coast 
guards let alone the equipment (gunboats and others) to patrol and provide some 
offences/deterrence on the maritime coasts. An assessment of the law enforcement 
personnel (maritime) responsible for the entire maritime security in 10 of the West Africa 
coastal states is a little above 200,000: Nigeria having 162,000 (IISS 2015). The figure below 
represents the enormity of the challenge faced on maritime borderlands, hence, the 
helplessness. 
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Figure 2: Capacity of Regional Law Enforcement in West Africa  
(Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015). 
 
 
Piracy 
 
The second factor that hinders a coherent maritime policy against drug trafficking is 
piracy. Piracy is one of the main threats to economic survival of the states. The main focus of 
the region/states on the maritime borders had been fighting obstacles (commodity seizures, 
kidnapping for ransom, oil bunkering and armed robbery at sea) on the Gulf of Guinea and 
the entire West Africa coast; which threatens the economic main stay of the region‟s 
export/import. According to the industry magazine Maritime Executive, pirate attacks in the 
Gulf of Guinea increased by 33% in 2013. The region is the second most dangerous area in 
the world for maritime transport, as it accounted for nearly 30% of attacks in African waters 
between 2003 and 2011, according to Maritime First. Therefore, the limited capacity these 
countries could muster, relating to maritime coast, was directed at fighting piracy for their 
economic survival. According to UNODC, while piracy is on the decline in the Somalia‟s Gulf 
of Aden, it may have shifts in spread to West Africa. While most of the attacks are 
concentrated around Benin, Côte d‟Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, among others; majority in 
this region take place in Nigeria‟s oil rich Niger Delta region (Ben-Ari 2013). For example, In 
Benin, 80% of state revenue comes from imports through the Cotonou seaport. In 2013, due 
to increased pirate attacks in West Africa, Lloyd‟s Market Association (umbrella group of 
maritime insurers) lists Nigeria, Benin and nearby waters in the same risk category as Somalia. 
This phenomenon has led to a significant 28% decline in the Benin revenue and decrease in 
maritime traffic; and by implication affected the livelihoods of the country‟s citizens (UNODC 
2013).  
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Choosing to focus their maritime aggression more on piracy than drug trafficking 
seems logical, but, a one coherent policy on the maritime waters could have been more 
effective and efficient. Unfortunately, despite the alarming increase in incidences (49 in 2011 
and 58 in 2012, while 28 alone in Nigeria in 2013) (The International Maritime Bureau), piracy 
in West Africa is yet to attract the needed global attention as was in Somalia (June 2008) 
through the platform of the UN Security Council. Therefore, West African regional and 
individual state‟s efforts to fight the problem, reduces the resources (human and material) 
and focus needed to tackle drug trafficking in the region‟s maritime sphere. 
 
Maritime Policy against Drug Trafficking 
 
The third challenge inhibiting the policy problem is absence of a wholly maritime 
policy against drug trafficking in West Africa. In view of the enormity of the impact of drug 
trafficking on the region, it is surprising to discover no policy; either at state, regional or 
international level entirely dedicated to confronting the menace via the maritime borders. 
Closest to it was the West African Coast Initiative (WACI). However, WACI is not entirely 
coastal initiative, but incorporates other components of land and air means through the 
Transnational Crime Unit (TCU). This is more so surprising because, despite contributing 80% 
to the entire trafficking network, little attention is given to maritime compare to other 
trafficking means. While most states have established drug laws and control agencies, the 
laws and agencies have little consideration for maritime approach. Regionally, beside efforts 
being pursued through WACI, there is very little clear policy coordination among the states 
on drug control on maritime borderlands. Other factors are: official corruption, weak state 
institutions, language barriers, old states rivalries, lack of maritime technical communication 
means, etc. (UNODC). 
 
CURRENT MARITIME RESPONSES TO DRUG TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA 
 
Despite the rising number of strategies, policies, initiatives and mechanisms developed 
at different levels (international, regional, sub-regional and national), they appear to suffer 
from a lack of comprehensive and integrated strategic framework that puts the round pegs in 
the square holes. There is no clear-cut response to drug trafficking through the maritime 
borderlands; however, the WACI initiative incorporated all forms of drug trafficking. West 
Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach to 
strengthen human and institutional capacity of law enforcement officials, initially in four post-
conflict countries to support the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan. West 
African Coast Initiative (WACI) is arguably the only well-intended coordinated policy response 
in the region. Launched officially in 2009 and being piloted in Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea- Bissau, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, and priority to Guinea eventually. West African Coast Initiative 
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(WACI): a policy initiative of ECOWAS Regional Action Plan jointly instituted by ECOWAS, 
UNODC, UNOWA/DPA, DPKO and INTERPOL. Still in its pilot phase, and through Transitional 
Crime Unit (TCU), had enhanced coordination of intelligence in the region on drug issues. In 
view of the enormity of the challenges, WACI along with other inland mechanisms helped 
halt the rising tides; reducing the trafficking rates from 47 tons to 19 (about 60%) between 
2005 and 2010 respectively. It has provided an operational avenue upon which actions on 
drug trafficking can be collective in the region. Also, increased cooperation across borders 
among the pilot countries and creating some state-level institutional changes linking actors 
from different law enforcement agencies within a country (Annan 2013). 
WACI‟s main impact is the creation of Transnational Crime Units (TCU), meant to 
enhance national and international coordination, as well as to enable intelligence-based 
information dissemination. The TCU in each country are to improve law enforcement 
cooperation and intelligence gathering. They are expected to be each country‟s elite inter-
agency units, trained and equipped to fight transnational organized crime and to coordinate 
their activities under an international framework (WACI 2013). Through the collaboration of 
WACI, tremendous progress has been achieved; especially in intercepting transshipments of 
drugs into the West Africa region; as indicated by Figure1. Close examination of the data 
reveals majority of the transshipments (numbers and quantity) and interceptions had 
happened on the sea and at seaports. WACI is a combine technical assistance initiative to 
help states address criminal networks and illicit activities by strengthening national and 
regional legal capacities. It leverages on partner‟s resourcefulness to mitigate and diminishing 
the threat of organized crime in the region and globally (Peace Operation Review, 2015). 
While, WACI had been partly credited with the recent downward trend (successes) in 
the seizures recorded since its creation, I believe, the reduction may have strong connection 
with the invigorated intelligence provided by WACI and/or a discovery of new trafficking 
routes. This initiative is very problematic in many fronts. First, it only bears the name „coastal 
initiative‟; meanwhile little of its operations have anything to do with maritime. Secondly, it 
suffers from funding and currently only in pilot phase; operational (TCUs) in five countries out 
the 16-member states of ECOWAS. Third, the WACI policy initiative does not have coastal 
security component or capacity for patrol and cannot empower the states for same. Fourth, 
Both ECOWAS and the AU Action Plans, and some other interventions are not synchronized; 
they seem to be working at cross purposes. 
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POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The policy response to the current gap in the existing framework: lack of clear-cut or 
absence of a maritime coordination policy against drug trafficking in the region must be 
handled from: improvement/amendments on existing plan or creation of fresh policy build-
up; especially for maritime affairs in view of its relevance as seen in Figure 1. A triangular 
synergy must be built using bottom-top approach through multi-level collaboration and 
resources leveraging. 
 
State Level 
 
West African states are not exception with respect to basic laws (some of which are 
regarded as very harsh) that deal with drug trafficking and even consumption (UN Treaty 
Collection 2013). Many have drug law enforcement legislation dating as far back as the 1930s. 
They are members of most of the UN Conventions; a few are: UN Drug Convention (1988), 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
(1961), UN Convention against Transnational Crime, among others. However, internal strives 
and lack of enablement (funds) to develop a formidable coastal security apparatus hinders all. 
An overhauling of the state system will make a huge difference. West African countries must 
develop a strong coastal security agency, with adequate equipment (gun boats and 
surveillance gadgets) and personnel, if their effort must be complementary with regional and 
global efforts. Each state should be able to patrol if not up until the international waters, but 
at least 100 nautical miles offshore and adequately be available at each borderland to its 
neighbors. A five-year development plan in this regard with funding from African 
Development Bank/World Bank/EU financing will be appropriate starting from 2016. In the 
same vein, political stability is critical to success of any new initiatives; West African states 
needs to evolve an inclusive political process and consultation with relevant actors in order to 
forge internal peace-building and state-building; thereby reducing its investments in 
prosecution of war. Similarly, since drug money is used to sponsor politicians in some states 
and corrupt the military hierarchies, there is concern that some states have been saboteurs or 
reluctant to work with the regional teams/action plan on the fight. In this light, the civil society 
organizations in these states should be strengthened to be the watch dog of the society and 
demand accountability from their government (internal monitors). The limitation in this policy 
option is that, states in this region are some of the poorest in the world; 13 out of the 16-
member states of ECOWAS are in the UN Least Developed Countries, at least five of them 
are within the 25 poorest countries in the world. Singlehandedly developing maritime 
capability will be near impossible without outside help. Secondly, since corruption/drug 
money has permeated the military, purging the institutions is required but might also plunge 
the country into instability if pushed too hard. 
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Regional Level 
 
The bulk of this problem is at best handled at regional collaborative level, because, it 
is a regional threat. However, fundamental to all steps moving forward is the political 
declaration needed to galvanize and sustain a regional maritime policy process in order to 
inspire consensus to a common threat. Regional political consensus is a necessary ingredient 
that allows for mobilizing and sharing of resources. Also, it enhances promotion of an 
enabling environment required to combat senior state official‟s involvement in the cocaine 
trade (UNODC, 2011). To this extent, a wholly independent maritime policy against drug 
trafficking will suffice. The current WACI or TCU should be divided into two components or 
departments, or at best separated: one specifically focusing on Inland drug trafficking and the 
other on maritime. Dedicating an entire structure to maritime waterways will enhance 
efficient utilization of resources and provide concise policy direction to address the biggest 
contributor to the region‟s drug trafficking problem. This will also enable WACI or TCU 
develop sea patrol capabilities to support the state‟s inadequacies. The inland will primarily 
be limited to land and air trafficking means, while both still gather intelligence to compliment 
the enhanced enforcement ability of member states. According to John Kerry (US Secretary 
of State), “the security of any region cannot be guaranteed without an effective law 
enforcement on its territorial waters” (SAMLEI 2015). Similar to the Southern Asia Maritime 
Initiative, a wholly established robust maritime policy will engender maritime law enforcement 
capacity and training in areas such as communication, intelligence gathering and monitoring 
and surveillance. 
Secondly, since greater percent of the drugs trafficked through the region are 
destined for Europe, collaboration is inevitable between ECOWAS maritime framework (to be 
developed within WACI or TCU as suggested) and EU sea patrol agencies (Frontex); 
especially for intelligence sharing and interceptions. Establishment of regional security force 
like the Frontex on the Gulf of Guinea and working in collaboration will be strategic. More so 
that, the bigger vessels from South America sometime mid-way off-load their drug content 
into smaller boats and head for Europe from the international waters. The partnership will 
help close loose ends between the two regions. The Praia Initiative promoted by ECOWAS 
and supported by UNODC and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) to 
combat the serious security threat posed by drug trafficking in the region; in partnership with 
the European Union (EU) should be revisited for an amendment. The omission of maritime 
security architecture against drug trafficking in the Praia conference was a big oversight on 
the path of the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS who endorsed the Regional 
Action Plan in Abuja in 2008. While the process is a home-grown response strategy, its 
neglected or deliberately excluded plan to cover maritime domain; which contributes the 
largest avenue for drug trafficking access to the region, making the initiative not only very 
weak, but unserious. Maritime component must be built into it to enable a comprehensive 
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policy approach easy to coordinate by air, sea and land. This revision can be done through 
setting up a specific committee and its recommendations submitted for endorsement by the 
ECOWAS highest organ. On the other hand, the maritime initiatives in the region could be 
harmonized to achieve different purposes from one standpoint. E.g. the fight against piracy 
could be combined with that of drug trafficking, thereby saving duplication of resources and 
crowding security management on the West African waterways and Gulf of Guinea. The two 
main regional policies against drugs could play the lead role in this direction. That is, the new 
AU Plan of Action which is designed to reduce drug harm, supply and demand in the region 
(IDPC Advocacy Note 2012) and ECOWAS Regional Action Plan, which consists of five 
thematic focuses: political leadership, national/regional cooperation, strengthening of legal 
frameworks, confronting drug abuse and associated health and security problems, and data 
generation. 
Unfortunately, while there are specific policy initiatives on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, 
besides the general initiatives against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), there is no 
policy with specific aim at addressing drug trafficking on the maritime coast of the region (yet 
contributes 80% to trafficking means into the region). Therefore, this lacuna could provide 
the window for a single coordinated maritime policy for breaching the two biggest threats 
(piracy and drug trafficking) to the region‟s waterways, and economic and political survival. 
The constraints of the regional-level policy options are: it might take time to build a 
maritime force and requires a huge capital investment, which might be heavy for the poor 
states. Bureaucratic bottlenecks might delay policy initiative, especially when it is government 
led. The role of spoilers (state agents/narco states), who benefits from proceeds of drug 
trafficking. 
 
Global Level 
 
Given the reality of the contribution of drug money to armed groups, state fragility, 
erosion of state legitimacy, corruption of political and security elites, and emergence of drug 
states (e.g. Guinea-Bissau) in the region; the global community (United Nations and G8) 
should declare the fight against drug trafficking in the region an emergency.  
The international waters directly linking South America and West Africa should be 
monitored through enhanced collaboration facilitated by UNODC and the international 
maritime policies dealing with drug trafficking. Something similar achieved in 2006 by the 
Spanish and British Navy, who intercepted a record 9,853 tons of cocaine on five ships off the 
coast of West Africa. In order to achieve its goals towards supporting West Africa response to 
drug trafficking, the EU funded Cocaine Route Programme (CRP) should be repositioned to 
complement whatever maritime department is created out of WACI or TCU. While the EU 
Cocaine Route Programme is expected to support West Africa Police Information Systems 
(WAPIS), Airport Cooperation Programme (AIRCOP), Seaport Cooperation Programme 
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(SEACOP), and an AML (European Union 2008), this policy paper considers the vagueness as 
unnecessary distractions. Rather, the programme should concentrate its support on the 
region‟s most vulnerable aspect: help to build maritime capabilities to fight drug trafficking. 
Most relevant and helpful in West African case against drug trafficking is the SEACOP‟s 
creation of Joint Maritime Control Units, which will share intelligence with units in targeted 
West African seaports. This strategy if incorporated into a single maritime coordination policy 
against drug trafficking as proposed by this policy paper, it will improve interdiction through 
coordination, information sharing and technical skills; beside the support to the general fight 
against drug trafficking in the region (Kofi Annan Foundation 2013). 
Giving the extent to which corruption induced by drug trafficking has permeated the 
highest hierarchy of the states in West Africa, according to the World Development Report 
(2011), the international community through relevant United Nations agencies and G8 (with 
such capabilities) should assist in efforts to trace illicit financial flows in order to identify 
involvement, name and shame persons whose income is perceived to be drug-related (World 
Bank, 2011). Besides South America, the West Africa region remain an area seriously affected 
by trafficking and corruption, coupled with weak national capacity needed to gather and 
process information on sophisticated financial transactions, or to investigate and prosecute 
offenders. The United Nations Security Council should urgently officially recognize drug 
trafficking, especially on West African maritime waterways as a high-level threat within the 
TOC family, capable of further undermining the development, stability and security of the 
region; and provide safe haven for terrorist organizations. The recognition is expected to 
classify fight against drug trafficking on the region‟s maritime waters as a conflict prevention 
strategy that requires UN member states increased cooperation with the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office on West Africa (UNOWA) 
(UNSC, 2009) Finally, the international community must help restore political stability in West 
Africa region and state-building efforts at strengthening institutions vital to development. The 
risk of this policy option is that, whereas the situation in the region requires urgent action, 
global responses are sometimes very slow, political and bureaucratic. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The maritime waterways constitute a life-wire to the West Africa region‟s economic 
survival and development. A region which emerged in the 1960s following independence 
wave as one of the most endowed with human and mineral resources. But wars and internal 
unrest, and lately drug trafficking have negatively impacted its abilities. Since the 2000s, drug 
trafficking has reduced the region to a safe haven for transnational criminal activities; 
empowering elements that threatens its stability. Despite several interventions to stem the 
tide, a fundamental policy error (lack of formidable maritime policy on drug trafficking) had 
transformed the region from its original good old gold coast region to now cocaine (coke) 
coast. Due to under-performance of the WACI initiative, collaborations at the states, regional 
and global levels is capable of extensively curbing the menace and restoring the region on a 
path of economic and political stability. All mechanisms other than blocking or investing 
heavily on the source of drug trafficking means into the region (maritime), it will mean, only 
the symptoms and not the cure is being treated. As inferred in the policy options 
recommended above, the problem can best be adequately addressed using holistic three-
ways methods, incorporating all stakeholders; although at different levels and creating roles 
for each actor‟s involvement. For example, at the state–level, we need to quench the fire 
promoting political instability from inside (via inclusive governance … including minority 
protection) and equally develop a standing maritime structure or agency responsible for 
fighting drug trafficking on the country‟s waterways; at least 100 nautical miles into the 
Atlantic Ocean and at border points between West African states. At the regional level, it is 
expected to set the maritime policy direction against drug trafficking in region, incorporating 
all needed support from bottom (states) and top (global community/resources). While the 
global-level intervention, both at the Gulf of Guinea and on the international maritime waters 
connecting South America to West Africa to Europe will provide complimentary support to 
the regional and individual states efforts; beside training/technical and equipment. 
Finally, another catastrophe (to watch out for) that may further compound the already 
dare situation in the region, if attention is not swift, is brewing local consumption of drugs. 
There is a massive growing concern over drug use in the region; leading the UN Secretary 
General to raise alarm that “West Africa is no longer just a transit route for drug traffickers 
but a growing destination, with more than a million users of illicit drugs. Rising consumption 
aggravates an already challenging public health environment and threatens socio-economic 
development” (UNSG/SM 2013).  
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